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Abstract According to the standard opinions in the literature, blocking the
unacceptable consequences of the notorious slingshot argument requires im-
posing constraints on the metaphysics of facts or on theories of definite
descriptions (or class abstracts). This paper argues that both of these well-
known strategies to rebut the slingshot overshoot the mark. The slingshot,
first and foremost, raises the question as to the adequate logical formalization
of statements about facts, i.e. of factual contexts. It will be shown that a
rigorous application of Quine’s maxim of shallow analysis to formalizations
of factual contexts paves the way for an account of formalizing such contexts
which blocks the slingshot without ramifications for theories of facts or definite
descriptions.
Keywords Slingshot argument · Logical formalization · Shallow analysis ·
Factual contexts
1 Introduction
Since Church [11], who draws on ideas of Frege [18], a specific type of
argument, now mostly known as the slingshot argument, has had considerable
influence on various areas in analytic philosophy. The argument has been seen
as establishing constraints on the metaphysics of facts and, in consequence, on
all kinds of theories drawing on facts, such as theories of truth, correspondence,
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truth-making, causation, or explanation.1 More concretely, the slingshot yields
the paradoxical result that non-extensional (non-truth-functional) sentential
connectives linking statements that stand for (or express) facts turn out to
be extensional after all, provided that two seemingly unproblematic inference
principles are taken to hold for these connectives. Roughly, the first of these
principles allows for a truth-preserving substitution of logically equivalent
expressions and the second licenses the substitution of co-referring singular
terms within contexts governed by a pertaining factual connective. Our infor-
mal assessment of the truth conditions of such contexts indeed suggests that
both of these substitution principles are correct. Yet, the slingshot argument
demonstrates that if these principles are implemented in certain formalisms,
the truth-functionality of factual connectives can be inferred, which is an
unacceptable result. The consequence is then often drawn that the identity of
facts must be spelled out in such a fine-grained way that one of the substitution
principles is rendered incorrect after all.
On the face of it, this argument’s broad influence is somewhat surprising
because the slingshot is an essentially formal argument. Its validity requires
a very specific kind of syntax that treats particular formal expressions as
primitive referring symbols, viz. expressions governed by iota-operators or
class abstraction. Moreover, as we shall see below, informal correlates of the
slingshot are invalid arguments. That is, there is a conflict between a formal
and an informal assessment of the validity of the slingshot, which conflict
lies at the core of the slingshot’s force. The formal rooting of the slingshot
raises the question as to how a formalism, relative to which expressions as
 xFx or {x|Fx} are referring symbols, can teach us anything about what a
suitable theory of facts must look like, how language relates to the world,
or what kind of entities stand in causal relations. In areas of philosophical
research that are not primarily concerned with formal matters, but with
questions as to facts, truth, correspondence, or causation, formalisms are mere
tools—very useful tools indeed—that, among other things, enable us to make
precise what we mean by informal statements, to explicate why correspond-
ing arguments are valid or invalid, or to resolve semantic ambiguities. Yet,
how could a particular syntactic treatment of definite descriptions or class
abstracts have any consequences for non-formal matters as the metaphysics of
facts?
Indeed, not all authors have drawn consequences from the slingshot that go
beyond formal matters. For instance, Gödel [19] essentially reads the argument
as a mere confirmation of Russell’s theory of descriptions, which treats definite
descriptions as quantificational rather than referring expressions (cf. also [36,
1Slingshots can be taken to impose constraints on the metaphysics of any kind of extralinguistic
entities that can be expressed or stated by statements—as facts, states, states of affairs, situations,
propositions, and so forth. For simplicity, I subsume all of these entities under the label “facts” in
this paper. For a very concise overview over the different uses of the slingshot argument cf. [8], for
an in-depth presentation cf. [28, 29] or [37].
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291–298]). Analogously, Cummins and Gottlieb [12] interpret the argument
to count against systems of set theory that treat class abstracts as primitive,
as does e.g. [6]. Instead of taking the slingshot to impose constraints on the
metaphysics of facts, these authors hold that the argument gives preference to
certain formalisms over others, to certain interpretations of definite descrip-
tions and class abstracts over others.
This paper argues that the primary questions raised by the slingshot argu-
ment do neither concern the ontology of facts nor the correct interpretation
of definite descriptions or class abstracts. Rather, the slingshot, first and fore-
most, raises the question as to the proper formal representation of statements
about facts, i.e. of statements as
– The fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar is identical to the fact that the son of
Servilia Caepionis stabbed Caesar.
– The fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar caused the fact that Caesar died.
For brevity, statements governed by connectives as “The fact that . . . is
identical to the fact that . . . ” or “The fact that . . . caused the fact that . . . ” shall
be said to constitute factual contexts. The slingshot persuasively demonstrates
that factual contexts are not as easily adequately formalized and their truth
conditions rendered formally transparent as might have been expected. More
precisely, I shall argue that the slingshot argument, in the first instance,
prompts the following two questions:
(Q1) What inference rules must a formal systemF provide such that the truth
conditions of factual contexts can be adequately captured by means of
F?
(Q2) What criteria regulate the adequate formalization of factual contexts
within F?
As this paper will show, Quine [32, 160]—one of the most eager defenders
of slingshots—has introduced a maxim of adequate formalization, the maxim
of shallow analysis, a rigorous application of which to statements about facts
paves the way for an account of formalizing factual contexts that answers (Q1)
and (Q2) without any commitments whatsoever to a specific metaphysics of
facts or a particular syntactic treatment of definite descriptions.
That is not to say that a metaphysical account of facts that considers
facts to be language dependent fine-grained entities or an analysis of definite
descriptions according to which the latter are non-referring quantificational
expressions do not have implications for answering these questions as well. On
the contrary, one of the central upshots of this paper will be that corresponding
theories of facts and definite descriptions impose such strong constraints on
answers to (Q1) and (Q2) that no adequate account of formalizing factual
contexts results. Fine-grained fact theories and Russellian analyses of definite
descriptions resolve the conflict between the formal and informal assessments
of the validity of the slingshot argument only at the price of giving rise to
other conflicts between formal and informal validity assessments with respect
to arguments involving factual contexts. Blocking the unwanted consequences
534 M. Baumgartner
of the slingshot and satisfactorily answering (Q1) and (Q2), however, does not
force a specific theory of facts or of definite descriptions upon us. A proper
theory of adequate formalization for factual contexts avoids the unwanted
consequences of the slingshot without ramifications for an analysis of facts or
definite descriptions.
2 The Slingshot
Before we can look at the details of the slingshot argument, a conceptual dis-
tinction must be explicitly introduced that will be of crucial importance for this
paper. Formal inferential dependencies among formulas must be distinguished
from informal inferential dependencies among natural language statements.
While formal dependence among formulas is to be understood relative to a
given calculus, two statements are said to be informally dependent if one of
them or its negation is judged to necessitate the truth or falsity of the other or
its negation without compulsory recourse to any criterion of this necessitation.2
Analogously, formal validity of inference schemes, i.e. of formalizations, must
be distinguished from informal validity of natural language arguments. While
formal validity is uncontroversially defined in a corresponding formal system,
there are several different notions of informal validity available (cf. [17]).
I shall here simply presuppose the (standard) model-theoretic notion: An
argument is informally valid iff under all systematic reinterpretations of its
non-logical vocabulary it holds that, whenever the premises are judged to
be true, so is the conclusion. That is, informal validity must be understood
relative to a given demarcation between logical and non-logical expressions,
which, in turn, hinges on a presupposed formalism L.3 In order to be able
to evaluate the informal validity of arguments by use of suitable formalisms,
theories of adequate formalization must guarantee a correspondence between
formal and informal validity. In particular, theories of adequate formalization
must validate the following validity principle (cf. [24, 30]):
(VP) An argument S is informally valid relative to the demarcation between
logical and non-logical expressions given by a formalism L iff there
exists at least one adequate formally valid formalization of S in L.
2For example, while p and p ∧ q are formally dependent, “Cameron is a mother” and “Cameron
is a woman” are informally dependent.
3For example, as to propositional logic, only expressions like “and” or “not” count as logical,
whereas modal systems additionally treat “necessary” and “possible” as logical expressions. For
simplicity, I subsequently only make the relativization of the notion of informal validity to a
demarcation between logical and non-logical expressions explicit where it is relevant to the
respective context.
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Above all, the slingshot argument reveals severe difficulties when it comes
to validating (VP) in cases of factual contexts, more specifically, when it
comes to reproducing the informal (in)validity of arguments involving factual
contexts by means of certain formalisms, viz. formalisms featuring primitive
iota-expressions or class abstracts. The following arguments are informally
judged to be valid:
1. The fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar is identical to the fact that Brutus
stabbed Caesar. Brutus stabbed Caesar if and only if Brutus is the one who
stabbed Caesar. Therefore, the fact that Brutus is the one who stabbed
Caesar is identical to the fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar.
2. The fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar caused the fact that Caesar died.
Brutus is identical to the son of Servilia Caepionis. Therefore, the fact that
the son of Servilia Caepionis stabbed Caesar caused the fact that Caesar
died.
3. The fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar caused the fact that Caesar died.
Brutus stabbed Caesar if and only if Brutus did not not stab Caesar. Brutus
is identical to Marcus. Therefore, the fact that Marcus did not not stab
Caesar caused the fact that Caesar died.
Relative to all reinterpretations of the non-logical vocabulary embedded in
the factual contexts of these arguments it holds that if the premises are judged
to be true, so are the conclusions. The informal validity of 1 to 3 suggests that
the identity of facts does not depend on which element of a set of logically
equivalent expressions or co-referring singular terms is used to state them.
Hence, the Principle of Substitutivity for Logical Equivalents (PSLE) and the
Principle of Substitutivity for Singular Terms (PSST) seem to hold for factual
contexts. PSLE says that if φ and ψ have the same truth-value relative to
all systematic reinterpretations of their non-logical vocabulary, i.e. φ |=|= ψ ,
then, if Σ(φ) is a true sentence containing at least one occurrence of φ, the
sentence Σ(ψ) is also true, where Σ(ψ) results from replacing at least one
occurrence of φ in Σ(φ) by ψ . PSST maintains that if two singular terms α and
β have the same referent, i.e. α = β, then, if the sentence Σ(α) containing at
least one occurrence of α is true, Σ(β), which results from Σ(α) by replacing
at least one occurrence of α in Σ(α) by β, is true as well.
Factual contexts are informally judged to differ from other non-extensional
contexts as “Shamus believes that Fa”, i.e. from hyperintensional contexts
(cf. [27, 127]): While a closed sentence as Fa does not express the language
independent fact that the object a is F within a belief context (cf. e.g. [18]
or [10]), Fa seems to express the fact that the object a is F within a factual
context, just as it does outside of that context and just as does any other
sentence that is logically equivalent to Fa. Furthermore, while a singular
term as a in “Shamus believes that Fa” does not refer to the object a,
but, say, to the pertinent part or element of Shamus’ corresponding belief,
the singular term a in “The fact that Fa is identical to the fact that Fa”
indeed refers to the object a, or so it seems. In consequence, while the
applicability of PSLE and PSST to hyperintensional contexts is informally
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excluded to begin with, the two rules are informally judged to be applicable
to factual contexts because logically equivalent expressions and co-referring
singular terms seem to function analogously in extensional and factual
contexts.
However, if PSLE and PSST are suitably adopted in formalisms that treat
expressions of type  xFx or {x|Fx} as primitive referring expressions, a number
of informally unacceptable consequences are rendered formally derivable.
Most of all, it can be shown that factual contexts are extensional, which they
most certainly are not. As indicated above and as is well-known from the lit-
erature, there are a number of different versions of this argument. They differ
with respect to formal means implemented but not with respect to conclusions
reached. Two categories of slingshot arguments can be distinguished: While
the arguments presented by Church [11], Quine [31, 32] or Davidson [13] draw
on class abstraction and presume the unrestricted validity of PSLE and PSST in
factual contexts, the slingshot as introduced by Gödel [19] and as meticulously
reconstructed by Neale [28, 29] uses iota-operators and does not presuppose
the substitutability of all logical equivalents in factual contexts, but only of so-
called Gödelian equivalents, i.e. of expressions as Fa and a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx).
None of these differences concerns more than formal detail. Since Gödel’s
slingshot rests on narrower substitution principles and thus, overall, on weaker
assumptions, I join Neale [29] in giving preference to Gödel’s argument in
the following.4 Moreover, as the formal details of this argument have been
thoroughly exhibited in the literature, I shall center my subsequent discussion
around a simplified and somewhat restricted version of Gödel’s argument,
which nonetheless suffices to exhibit all the core questions raised by slingshot
arguments. For details on the unrestricted Gödelian slingshot the reader is
referred to Neale [28, 29].
Instead of presupposing that any logical equivalents are substitutable salva
veritate (s.v.) in factual contexts, the Gödelian slingshot only assumes that
 -Conversion ( -Conv), which is a standard equivalence transformation for
extensional contexts, also holds in factual contexts. Subject to  -Conv, an
extensional formula Σ(x/α), which is the result of replacing every occurrence
of x in the formula Σ(x) containing at least one occurrence of x by the singular
term α, can be substituted s.v. by the formula α =  x(x = α ∧ Σ(x))—and vice
versa. α =  x(x = α ∧ Σ(x)) is to be read as “α is identical to the unique x
which is identical to α and Σ(x)” or, more colloquially, as “α is the thing
which is Σ”. Both relative to a Russellian quantificational understanding of
iota-expressions and relative to a suitable referential interpretation, Σ(x/α)
and α =  x(x = α ∧ Σ(x)) are logically equivalent (cf. [29, Chapters 9, 10]).5
If factual contexts are symbolized by @[. . .], the first crucial inference rule
4Not all authors agree that Gödel’s slingshot is preferable. Sobel [37], for instance, favors the
Church–Quine–Davidson variant.
5Note that referential treatments of definite descriptions give rise to intricate semantic questions
in case of so-called improper descriptions. These complications are sidestepped in the present
context. For further details cf. [27, Chapter 3].
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implemented in Gödel’s slingshot can be specified in terms of @+ -Conv (cf.
[29, Chapter 9]):
@+ -Conv : @[Σ(x/α)] @[α =  x(x = α ∧ Σ(x))]
@[α =  x(x = α ∧ Σ(x))] @[Σ(x/α)]
@+ -Conv simply states that within factual contexts, expressions of type
Σ(x/α) and α =  x(x = a ∧ Σ(x)) are substitutable s.v.
The second inference rule needed for the Gödelian slingshot is also bor-
rowed from extensional contexts: Whenever for any two definite descrip-
tions  xΦx and  xΨ x:  xΦx =  xΨ x, then  xΦx and  xΨ x are substitutable
s.v.6 Likewise, whenever for any definite description  xΦx and any name α:
 xΦx = α, then  xΦx and α are substitutable s.v. Neale refers to this rule as
 -Substitution, or  -Subs for short. If definite descriptions are understood
referentially,  -Subs is simply a special case of PSST. Adapting  -Subs to
factual contexts yields the second inference rule needed for Gödel’s slingshot
(cf. [29, Chapter 7]):
@+ -Subs :  xΦx = α α =  xΦx  xΦx =  xΨ x
@[Σ( xΦx)] @[Σ(α)] @[Σ( xΦx)]
@[Σ(α)] @[Σ( xΦx)] @[Σ( xΨ x)]
As @+ -Conv and @+ -Subs are mere adaptations of PSLE and PSST to a
corresponding iota-formalism and as PSLE and PSST informally appear to be
correct for factual contexts, there are prima facie no grounds on which to deny
the correctness of @+ -Conv and @+ -Subs. However, the Gödelian sling-
shot now shows that @+ -Conv and @+ -Subs allow for formal inferences
that we do not take to be informally valid. To illustrate, consider the following
statements:
(a) Obama is a politician.
(b) Obama is married.
(c) The fact that Obama is a politician is identical to the fact that Obama is a
politician.
(d) The fact that Obama is married is identical to the fact that Obama is a
politician.
Informally, we would say that (a), (b), and (c) are true, while (d) is false, for
(a) and (b) state different facts about Obama. (a), (b), and (c) do not informally
6Whenever possible I omit brackets from iota-expressions. That is,  xΨ x corresponds to Russell’s
( x)(Ψ x), cf. [38, Chapter ∗14].
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imply (d). Yet, provided that @+ -Conv and @+ -Subs indeed hold, the
following is a correct derivation, where F stands for “. . . is a politician”, G for
“. . . is married”, a refers to Obama, and @[. . .] represents the connective “The
fact that . . . is identical to the fact that Obama is a politician”:
(ζ1) 1 [1] Fa A
2 [2] Ga A
3 [3] @[Fa] A
1 [4] a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx) 1,  -Conv
2 [5] a =  x(x = a ∧ Gx) 2,  -Conv
3 [6]  x(x = a ∧ Fx) =  x(x = a ∧ Gx) 4,5,  -Subs
3 [7] @[a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx)] 3, @+ -Conv
1,2,3 [8] @[a =  x(x = a ∧ Gx)] 6,7, @+ -Subs
1,2,3 [9] @[Ga] 8, @+ -Conv
(ζ1) shows that, if @+ -Conv and @+ -Subs indeed guarantee the transition
from truths to truths, the expressions in lines [1], [2], and [3] formally imply [9].
As [1], [2], [3], and [9] are the formalizations of (a), (b), (c), (d), respectively,
(ζ1) can be seen to formally exclude that (a) to (c) are true and (d) false,
because, as to @+ -Conv and @+ -Subs, any fact about Obama is identical to
any fact about Obama.
The primary problem the slingshot argument reveals is that there exists a
conflict between our informal assessment of the inferential (in)dependencies
among (a) to (d) and our (attempted) formal representation of these
(in)dependencies within a corresponding iota-formalism—call this the sling-
shot conf lict for short. Such a conflict, trivially, can be resolved in one of two
ways: (I) Either we take the formal result reached above to force us—by virtue
of (VP)—to revise our assessment of the informal (in)dependencies among
(a) to (d), or (II) we insist that, notwithstanding the formal result, (a) to (c)
can be true, while (d) is false and, hence, that something has gone wrong in
the application of our formal apparatus to these statements. Only very few
authors, as e.g. [13], even consider resolving the conflict along the lines of (I).
To actually question our informal understanding of statements (a) to (d) in
light of a formal argument as (ζ1) is simply self-defeating. We are as certain
as we can possibly get when it comes to assessing inferential (in)dependencies
among colloquial statements that the truth of (a) to (c) in no way necessitates
the truth of (d). If, in the end, that should turn out to be a false assessment,
we would have to conclude that prior to being presented with the slingshot ar-
gument we radically misunderstood statements involving factual contexts. Yet,
having a reliable understanding of natural language statements is a necessary
precondition of being able to adequately formalize these statements. In turn,
being reasonably certain that the formalizations involved in the slingshot are
adequate, is an essential precondition of drawing any kind of consequences—
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be they metaphysical or formal—from the argument.7 Therefore, reaction (I)
directly undermines itself.
In consequence, (II) is the only viable manner to resolve the slingshot
conflict. Apparently something has gone wrong when we applied our formal
tools to render the informal (in)dependencies among (a) to (d) formally
transparent. Yet, it is far from obvious where exactly the error has occurred.
3 Blocking the Slingshot with Metaphysics or Russell
On the face of it, there are two conceivable sources of error: Either, at least
one of the lines [1], [2], [3], and [9] in (ζ1) does not feature an adequate
formal representation of the corresponding statements (a), (b), (c), and (d),
or, contrary to first appearances, at least one of the inference rules @+ -Conv
and @+ -Subs is incorrect after all. The formalizations contained in [1] to
[3] and [9] are utterly simple. They each identify a predicate and a singular
term, and two of them additionally feature a sentential connective. All of
these elements, and no others, are also contained in the corresponding natural
language statements. In consequence, if [1] to [3] and [9] are verbalized
along the lines of the provided interpretation, the formalized statements are
recovered in their exact natural language form. There is a widely accepted
and used maxim in the literature on logical formalization subject to which
formalizations that successfully pass this so-called verbalization test are ade-
quate (cf. e.g. [9, Chapter 10], or [36, 64–67]). Accordingly, all authors opting
for strategy (II) vis-à-vis the slingshot conflict have localized its source in
@+ -Conv or in @+ -Subs (or analogous rules for class abstracts), and not
in the formalizations.
Opinions (of course) diverge as to which of these rules to reject and as to
why the rejected rule is incorrect. Three opinion groups can be distinguished.
The first group—call it A—rejects @+ -Conv (or an analogous rule for class
abstracts) and, since @+ -Conv is a special case of PSLE, this group also
denies the correctness of PSLE for factual contexts.8 The second group—
group B—rejects @+ -Subs (or an analogous rule for class abstracts) and
reads the latter as a iota-version of PSST, which, accordingly is then considered
an incorrect rule for factual contexts as well.9 Finally, the third group—C—also
7For more details on the interplay between informal and formal validity assessments cf. [4] and [3].
8Cf. e.g. [1, 2, 14, 23, 39]. In fact, all of these authors focus on versions of the slingshot that draw on
class abstraction, and, thus, do not literally reject @+ -Conv but the corresponding rule for class
abstracts.
9Cf. e.g. [25, 26] or [5].
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rejects @+ -Subs (or an analogous rule for class abstracts), but does not take
that rule to be an adaptation of PSST to a iota-formalism, because definite
descriptions (or class abstracts) are not considered to be referring expressions
by the authors in C.10
If formal systems used to reproduce factual contexts do not provide in-
ference rules allowing for substitutions of logical equivalents or co-referring
definite descriptions and proper names, not all of the arguments 1, 2, and 3 can
be proven to be valid by formal means. To avert a violation of (VP), authors
in groups A and B normally read the impossibility to formalize arguments
as 1, 2, and 3 by formally valid inference schemes as evidence to the effect
that corresponding arguments are in fact invalid. Rejecting the validity of
such arguments is then backed up with theories stipulating a fine-grained
ontological makeup of facts that, in one way or another, renders the identity
of facts sensitive to the particular linguistic expressions chosen to state them.
That is, even though arguments as 1, 2, or 3 seem to be informally valid,
which suggests that facts are—at least in some circumstances—not multiplied
by redescribing them by use of different logically equivalent expressions or
of co-referring singular terms, representatives of A and B read the slingshot
argument as evidence to the contrary.11 Plainly, this line of reasoning indeed
blocks the slingshot. Yet, groups A and B are ready to pay a high theoretical
price. For analogously to authors opting for strategy (I), members of A
and B significantly revise assessments of the informal dependencies among
statements featuring factual contexts in light of the slingshot argument. That
is, they take a formal argument to show that factual contexts as in 1, 2, or 3 had
been misunderstood prior to the development of that argument. As shall be
substantiated in the second half of this paper, a proper account of formalizing
factual contexts validates (VP) by, on the one hand, blocking the slingshot
argument and by, on the other, formally reproducing the validity of arguments
as 1, 2, or 3.
Representatives of group C, in turn, do not justify their rejection of
@+ -Subs along metaphysical lines, but by drawing on Russell’s theory of
descriptions. As is well known, according to Russell, definite descriptions
are incomplete non-primitive symbols. They never occur in isolation, but
only in broader sentential contexts, where, on Russell’s account, they get a
quantificational and not a referential interpretation.12 Subject to this theory,
which is formally condensed in the famous definition ∗14.01 of the Principia
Mathematica, an identity statement as the one in line [4] of (ζ1) is a mere
10Cf. e.g. [12, 19]. Cf. also [29] for a detailed reconstruction of this line of reasoning.
11Of course, the different metaphysical accounts of facts offered by the authors in these first two
groups deviate significantly. All that matters for our purposes is that these theories all entail the
incorrectness of one of the inference rules implemented in the slingshot.
12Cf. e.g. [35, 244–246, 253–254] or [29, 167].
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shorthand for the uniquely existential sentence (1), to which PSST cannot be
applied.
∃x(∀y(y = a ∧ Fy ↔ y = x) ∧ a = x) (1)
That is, representatives of group C endorse PSST for factual contexts and
reject @+ -Subs, because the latter treats definitive descriptions as primitive
referring expressions which, in fact, they are not. The slingshot is, thus,
interpreted as additional evidence for the adequacy of Russell’s theory of
descriptions.
Before we can look at the merits of this Russellian path around the slingshot,
one crucial qualification is called for. Even though Whitehead and Russell [38]
do not literally regard definite descriptions as referring expressions, in ∗14.15
and ∗14.16 they nonetheless show that, in extensional contexts, expressions of
type  xΦx can be treated as if they were singular terms. They demonstrate that
the transitions rendered possible by  -Subs are in fact derivable as theorems in
standard first-order logic.  -Subs can, hence, be introduced as a derived rule of
inference for quantificationally understood definite descriptions that appear in
extensional contexts. That is, rejecting @+ -Subs based on a non-referential
interpretation of definite descriptions does only half the work required to
block the slingshot. It must moreover be established that the iota-expressions
involved in Gödel’s argument appear in non-extensional contexts. For if that is
not guaranteed, as we shall see shortly, the slingshot can be run based only on
@+ -Conv and standard inference rules of first-order logic (including PSST),
i.e. even without @+ -Subs.
As is well known, a quantificational account of definite descriptions may
give rise to ambiguities of scope. A definite description contained in a factual
context as @[Φ xΨ x] can be given a narrow scope reading as expressed in (n-
@ x) or a wide scope reading as stated in (w-@ x).13
@[Φ xΨ x]  @[∃x(∀y(Ψ y ↔ y = x) ∧ Φx)] (n-@ x)
@[Φ xΨ x]  ∃x(∀y(Ψ y ↔ y = x) ∧ @[Φx]) (w-@ x)
The two readings, obviously, are not equivalent. While the non-extensional
sentential operator @[. . .] is the main operator of the narrow scope reading,
the wide scope reading amounts to an existentially quantified conjunction,
only one conjunct of which is governed by @[. . .]. As a result, in (n-@ x) the
definite description  xΨ x is embedded in a non-extensional context, whereas
the matrix of  xΨ x is located in an extensional context in (w-@ x).
In consequence, if the definite descriptions contained in the slingshot are
systematically interpreted with wide scopes, the argument can be run even
without @+ -Subs. (ζ2) exhibits the details of this ‘wide scope slingshot’,
13For more details on scope ambiguities involving definite descriptions cf. [38], ∗14, [34], or [27,
Chapter 4].
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where Fa, Ga, @[Fa], and @[Ga] again stand for (a), (b), (c), and (d),
respectively.
(ζ2) 1 [1] Fa A
2 [2] Ga A
3 [3] @[Fa] A
2 [4] a =  x(x = a ∧ Gx) 2,  -Conv
3 [5] @[a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx)] 3, @+ -Conv
2 [6] ∃x(∀y(y = a ∧ Gy ↔ y = x)∧ 4, ∗14.01
a = x)
3 [7] ∃x(∀y(y = a ∧ Fy ↔ y = x)∧ 5, w-@ x
@[a = x])
8* [8] ∀y(y = a ∧ Gy ↔ y = b)∧ A
a = b
9* [9] ∀y(y = a ∧ Fy ↔ y = c)∧ A
@[a = c]
9* [10] (a = a ∧ Fa ↔ a = c)∧ 9, ∀-elim
@[a = c]
9* [11] a = a ∧ Fa ↔ a = c 10, ∧-elim
[12] a = a 	-intro
1 [13] a = a ∧ Fa 1,12 ∧-intro
1,9* [14] a = c 11,13 MPP
8* [15] a = b 8, ∧-elim
1,8*,9* [16] b = c 14,15, trans of =
1,8*,9* [17] ∀y(y = a ∧ Fy ↔ y = b)∧ 9,16 PSST
@[a = b ]
1,8*,9* [18] @[a = b ] 17, ∧-elim
8* [19] ∀y(y = a ∧ Gy ↔ y = b) 8, ∧-elim
1,8*,9* [20] ∀y(y = a ∧ Gy ↔ y = b)∧ 18,19 ∧-intro
@[a = b ]
1,8*,9* [21] ∃x(∀y(y = a ∧ Gy ↔ y = x)∧ 20, ∃-intro
@[a = x])
1,2,9* [22] ∃x(∀y(y = a ∧ Gy ↔ y = x)∧ 6,8,21, ∃-elim
@[a = x])
1,2,3 [23] ∃x(∀y(y = a ∧ Gy ↔ y = x)∧ 7,9,22, ∃-elim
@[a = x])
1,2,3 [24] @[a =  x(x = a ∧ Gx)] 23, w-@ x
1,2,3 [25] @[Ga] 24, @+ -Conv
Contrary to (ζ1), however, it is fairly obvious what the problem is with (ζ2):
The transitions from line [3] to lines [5] and [7] and from [23] to lines [24]
and [25] are not truth-preserving. In other words, if descriptions in factual
contexts are read with wide scopes, @+ -Conv is not a correct inference rule.
That means representatives of group C who endorse @+ -Conv and reject
@+ -Subs based on a non-referential treatment of definite descriptions read
definite descriptions in factual contexts with narrow scope. This then yields
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that @[. . .] is the main operator of the expression in line [5], which blocks the
transition to [7] and prohibits subsequent applications of ∃-elimination. In sum,
rejecting @+ -Subs on account of Russell’s theory of descriptions and reading
descriptions in factual contexts with narrow scope blocks the slingshot—an
endorsement of @+ -Conv and PSST for factual contexts notwithstanding.
This way around the slingshot enables group C to reject @+ -Subs while
insisting on the correctness of PSST for factual contexts, and, thus, to draw
significantly weaker consequences from the slingshot than their peers in group
B. Nonetheless, in what follows it shall be shown that even though a quan-
tificational understanding of definite descriptions coupled with a narrow scope
reading of descriptions in factual contexts allows for rebutting the slingshot
while maintaining PSST, the unwanted consequences of such a rejection of
@+ -Subs—to a large extent—are the same as the unwanted consequences
of rejecting PSST for factual contexts: Not all informally valid arguments
involving factual contexts can be formally reproduced. Consider the following
argument:
4. (P1) The fact that the son of Servilia Caepionis stabbed Caesar
caused the fact that Caesar died.
(P2) The son of Servilia Caepionis is identical to the husband
of Porcia Catonis.
(C) The fact that the husband of Porcia Catonis stabbed Caesar
caused the fact that Caesar died.
Causes and effects are entities in nature that are independent of our
linguistic reference to them. It thus holds that if (P2) is true, (P1) and (C) state
the same causal dependency as they pick out the same cause of the fact that
Caesar died. Whenever (P1) and (P2) are true, so is (C). Plainly, the validity of
4 can easily be formally reproduced by means of @+ -Subs. However, if that
rule is rejected based on a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions, formally
capturing the validity of 4 gives rise to severe problems.
To see this, let us formalize (P1), (P2), and (C) in a Russellian vein. By
letting F stand for “. . . is a son of Servilia Caepionis”, G for “. . . stabbed
Caesar”, p for “Caesar died” and by representing the factual causal connective
“The fact that . . . caused the fact that . . . ” by @[. . . , . . .], the narrow scope
reading of (P1) is expressible in terms of (Pn1) and the wide scope reading in
terms of (Pw1 ).
14
@[∃x(∀y(Fy ↔ y = x) ∧ Gx), p] (Pn1
)
∃x(∀y(Fy ↔ y = x) ∧ @[Gx, p]) (Pw1
)
14The possibility of interpreting definite descriptions in factual causal statements to have wide
scope is normally not considered in the literature on fact causation. I owe this point to Michael
Gabbay.
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In contrast, there are no scope ambiguities involved in (P2). By introducing H
for “. . . is a husband of Porcia Catonis”, a Russellian analysis of (P2) yields:
∃x∃y(∀z1(Fz1 ↔ z1 = x) ∧ ∀z2(Hz2 ↔ z2 = y) ∧ x = y) (P2)
Analogously to the first premise, the conclusion of 4 allows for a narrow
and a wide scope reading. They are formally reproduced in (Cn) and (Cw),
respectively.
@[∃x(∀y(Hy ↔ y = x) ∧ Gx) , p] (Cn)
∃x(∀y(Hy ↔ y = x) ∧ @[Gx , p]) (Cw)
(P2) states that the extensions of F and H comprise exactly one and the
same element. As co-extensional predicates can only be substituted s.v. in
extensional contexts, the validity of the two Russellian readings of 4 hinges on
whether F and H occur in extensional contexts. While that is not the case for
(Pn1) and (C
n), F and H are located outside of the context governed by the non-
extensional causal connective in (Pw1 ) and (C
w). Accordingly, (P2) licenses to
replace H for F in (Pw1 ) which directly yields (C
w). That is, whereas a narrow
scope analysis of 4 generates an invalid formalization, the validity of 4 would
be formally reproducible without the use of @+ -Subs by drawing on a wide
scope reading of the definite descriptions contained in (P1) and (C). Yet, as
we have seen above, blocking the slingshot in the vein of group C presupposes
definite descriptions embedded in factual contexts to have narrow scopes. As a
direct consequence, endorsing @+ -Conv and PSST for factual contexts, while
rejecting @+ -Subs, renders it impossible to formally account for the validity
of 4.
At this point, the representative of group C might be inclined to argue
that definite descriptions in factual contexts must only be read with narrow
scopes in connection with the slingshot argument but not in cases like 4.
More concretely, it might be held that only descriptive analyses of subject-
predicate statements as are generated by @+ -Conv, i.e. expressions of the
form @[α =  x(x = α ∧ Φx)], must be systematically understood with narrow
scope, while other descriptions embedded in factual contexts may be read
with either narrow or wide scopes. However, as the Church–Quine–Davidson
slingshot shows, descriptive analyses of this Gödelian type are not the only sort
of expressions involving definite descriptions that can be used to run slingshot
arguments. Hence, all other—potentially infinite—slingshot-inducing expres-
sions would have to be confined to narrow scope interpretations as well. And
what is the general criterion distinguishing those descriptions embedded in
factual contexts that must be read with narrow scopes from those that merely
may be thus interpreted?
Apart from problems of this kind, opting for the wide scope analysis of the
descriptions contained in 4 receives no support from available semantics for
factual causal statements, as are e.g. developed by Bennett [5] or Mellor [26].
According to these accounts, factual causal statements are of the form: “The
fact that φ caused the fact that ψ” is true iff Ω(φ,ψ), where φ and ψ stand for
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closed sentences and Ω denotes the set of conditions imposed on φ and ψ by
a pertaining theory in order for φ and ψ to be causally connected. Common
candidates for Ω are, for instance, that ψ must be derivable from φ in com-
bination with a causal law L and a causal background B or that the probabil-
ity/propensity/chance that ψ holds is higher in the closest φ-worlds than in the
closest non-φ-worlds. While the details of these different proposals for Ω are of
no relevance for our purposes, it is crucial to note that factual causal statements
relate logically independent closed sentences stating the causing and the caused
facts. This constraint is straightforwardly met by the narrow scope readings
of 4. (Pw1 ), for example, identifies the fact that there exists exactly one son of
Servilia Caepionis who stabbed Caesar as cause of the fact that Caesar died—
and analogously for (Cn). The constraint, however, is violated in the wide scope
readings. In (Pw1 ) and (C
w) the first expression governed by @[. . . , . . .] is an
open sentence. Hence, the truth conditions of the third conjuncts within the
scopes of the existential quantifiers of (Pw1 ) and (C
w) are not determinable by
means of available semantics for the factual causal connective.
Even if suitable semantics for factual causal contexts featuring Russellian
descriptions with wide scopes should be developed in the future, it is highly
dubitable that (Pw1 ) and (C
w) can be said to capture the truth conditions of
(P1) and (C), respectively. To see this, compare (Pw1 ) and (P1). If Servilia
Caepionis, in fact, had two sons one of which was Brutus who stabbed Caesar,
(Pw1 ) turns out false because its first conjunct is false. Yet, would we informally
judge (P1) to be false as well? The answer to that question, I presume, depends
on the preferred analysis of causation. The Humean, for instance, who wants
to reduce causation to regularities or probability raising will say that (P1) is
still true, because regularities may hold even if their antecedents are false or
because the probability of Caesar dying is increased even if the description
contained in (P1) is improper. In contrast, if causes are required to allow for
deducing their effects in combination with relevant covering laws, (P1) will
rather turn out false if its description is improper. Hence, the truth conditions
of (P1) and (C), in the end, depend on the semantics of “The fact that . . . caused
the fact that . . . ”. In order to formally reproduce this primacy of the factual
causal connective for the truth conditions of (P1) and (C), @[. . . , . . .] must
be the main operator of corresponding formalizations. This condition is only
satisfied by the narrow scope readings (Pn1) and (C
n).
All in all, the slingshot conflict can be resolved either by drawing on a fine-
grained metaphysics of facts or on Russell’s theory of descriptions. Both of
these strategies, however, resolve it only at the price of giving rise to other
conflicts between informal and formal validity assessments for arguments
involving factual contexts. According to representatives of groupA, informally
valid arguments as 1 and 3 cannot be formalized by formally valid inference
schemes. The strategy of group B, in turn, entails that informally valid ar-
guments as 2, 3, and 4 cannot be formally mirrored. Finally, group C cannot
formally account for the validity of arguments as 2 and 4.
Strategies to block the slingshot argument that cannot formally reproduce
the validity of arguments as 1, 2, 3, or 4 do not adequately capture our informal
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understanding of factual contexts. Members of groups A, B, and C either
have to concede that their accounts are not complete insofar as they cannot
reproduce all informally valid arguments involving factual contexts and thus
violate (VP), or they are forced to revise informal validity assessments to the
effect that not all of 1, 2, 3, and 4 are valid after all. Both of these consequences
are unsatisfactory. The slingshot conflict, first and foremost, reveals that we do
not yet fully understand how to apply available formal tools to factual contexts.
A theory of adequate formalization for factual contexts must validate (VP)
by reproducing our informal understanding of factual contexts, which, among
other things, entails that 1, 2, 3, and 4 are valid arguments and that the truth
of (a) to (c) is compatible with the falsity of (d). Apparently, we informally
attribute truth conditions to factual contexts such that logical equivalents and
co-referring definite descriptions and proper names are substitutable s.v. in
some factual contexts, while in others at least one of those substitutions is
incorrect. The remainder of this paper is going to identify the subset of factual
contexts for which both of these substitution principles hold.
4 Revising @+ -SUBS
Before we can tackle the question as to the details of a suitable restriction
of @+ -Conv or @+ -Subs we, first, have to decide on which of the two
rules to modify. On the face of it, there is no reason to expect that there
is only one right way to go here. Formalisms are artificial products that
build on conventional definitions whose usefulness must be assessed based
on pragmatic criteria as simplicity or expressiveness. Accordingly, revising
either @+ -Conv or @+ -Subs might eventually yield an adequate account
of formalizing factual contexts. However, simplicity favors a revision of @+
 -Subs, because the correctness of @+ -Subs is doubtful on grounds that are
independent of the slingshot. Thus, since @+ -Subs must be modified anyway
and since there are no comparable independent grounds to revise @+ -Conv,
there is no reason to also modify @+ -Conv in light of the slingshot.
To see that restricting @+ -Subs is called for independently of the slingshot,
consider the following statements:15
(e) Obama is identical to the one who is Obama and a politician.
(f) The fact that Obama is identical to the one who is Obama and a politician
is identical to the fact that Obama is a politician.
(g) The fact that Obama is identical to Obama is identical to the fact that
Obama is a politician.
Informally, we would say that (e) and (f) are true, while (g) is false.
That is, (e) and (f) do not informally imply (g). Yet, if @+ -Subs were
15An analogous example can be found in [26, 118].
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to hold unrestrictedly, the following would turn out to be a valid inference
scheme—where a refers to Obama, F stands for “. . . is a politician”, and @[. . .]
symbolizes the connective “The fact that . . . is identical to the fact that Obama
is a politician”:
(ζ3) 1 [1] a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx) A
2 [2] @[a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx)] A
1,2 [3] @[a = a] 1,2, @+ -Subs
While being a politician is a contingent fact, being self-identical is certainly
not. Thus, these are two different facts about Obama. (ζ3) demonstrates that
@+ -Subs alone may lead from truths to falsehoods. Similar transitions from
true to false expressions may occur independently of Gödelian equivalents,
for instance in case of what Quine [32, 148–149] has dubbed Kronecker
descriptions:
(ζ4) 1 [1] 1 =  x((x = 1 ∧ Fa) ∨ (x = 0 ∧ ¬Fa)) A
2 [2] @[1 =  x((x = 1 ∧ Fa) ∨ (x = 0 ∧ ¬Fa))] A
1,2 [3] @[1 = 1] 1,2, @+ -Subs
The expression in line [1] of (ζ4) is formally equivalent to Fa. In consequence,
if @[. . .] is interpreted as above, line [2] is true, whereas line [3] is not. Hence,
@+ -Subs may turn true into false statements. These findings unmistakably
show that @+ -Subs is not correct as it was formulated in Section 2. We do
not attribute truth conditions to factual contexts such that co-referring definite
descriptions are generally substitutable s.v. @+ -Subs is not unrestrictedly
applicable to factual contexts.
5 Shallow Analysis
@+ -Subs must be restricted in a way that, first, resolves the slingshot conflict
by yielding the formal invalidity of the slingshot argument and of inferences as
(ζ3) and (ζ4), and that, second, does not give rise to other conflicts between
formal and informal validity assessments. As it turns out, the literature on
adequate formalization provides all the necessary conceptual and criterial
means required for such a restriction of @+ -Subs. Those means just need
to be assembled properly. To this end, we need to introduce the notions of
correct formalization, structural complexity, and shallow formalization.
Authors developing criteria of adequate formalization, as Blau [7], Epstein
[15, 16], Sainsbury [36], Brun [9], or Baumgartner and Lampert [4], all agree on
one core criterion of adequate formalization: Adequate formalizations must be
correct. Concisely put, correctness amounts to the following: The formalization
Γ1 of a statement A1 is correct iff whatever formally follows from Γ1 is a
formalization of a natural language statement that informally follows from A1,
and whatever formally implies Γ1 is a formalization of a natural language state-
ment that informally implies A1. Correctness is necessary but not sufficient
for the adequacy of formalizations. Formalization theories complement it with
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further criteria, most of which are of no relevance to our current purposes.
Such as to illustrate the application of the correctness criterion, consider
statement (h) along with the forthright formalization Eq. 2.
(h) Obama is a politician or Obama is married.
p ∨ q (2)
p : Obama is a politician. ; q : Obama is married.
To establish the correctness of Eq. 2 for (h) it must be shown that Eq. 2
does not allow for inferences that (h) does not sanction and that Eq. 2 does
not follow from premises (h) does not informally follow from. For example,
Eq. 2 follows from p and from q. In accordance, (h) informally follows from
“Obama is a politician” and from “Obama is married”. Or Eq. 2 formally
implies p ∨ q ∨ r and ¬p → q. (h) correspondingly informally entails “Obama
is a politician or Obama is married or Shamus is Pope” as well as “If Obama is
not a politician, Obama is married”. The correctness of Eq. 2 for (h) is proven
if it is established that all formal dependencies in which Eq. 2 is involved
have informal counterparts.16 Plainly, any formula that is logically equivalent
to Eq. 2 is involved in the exact same inferential dependencies as Eq. 2.
Therefore, expressions as p ∨ (q ∧ r ↔ r) or (r ∧ ¬r) ∨ (p ∨ q)—or any other
equivalent formula—are just as correct for (h) as Eq. 2. Moreover, of course,
(h) can also be correctly formalized by first-order means:
Fa ∨ Ga (3)
a =  x(x = a ∧ (Fx ∨ Gx)) (4)
1 =  x((x = 1 ∧ (Fa ∨ Ga)) ∨ (x = 0 ∧ ¬(Fa ∨ Ga)) (5)
a : Obama ; F : . . . is a politician ; G : . . . is married
While Eqs. 3, 4, and 5 are formally equivalent, they are not formally equivalent
to Eq. 2. That is, there may exist numerous non-equivalent correct formal-
izations of one particular statement A1. To every correct formalization of
A1 there exists an infinite amount of equivalent correct formalizations. The
correct formalizations of a statement can thus be grouped in equivalence
classes ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn.
The formalizations contained in such equivalence classes can be ordered
with respect to structural complexity. For instance, Eq. 5 introduces more
structural complexity than Eq. 4, which, in turn, is more complex than Eq. 3.
As Hodges [21, 47] puts it, a complexity measure numerically reproduces the
property that “any formula has a higher complexity than any of its proper
subformulas”. Accordingly, he proposes to define the structural complexity of
a formula Γ1 to be the number of its subformulas, where the subformulas of
Γ1 are the atomic expressions contained in Γ1, the molecular expressions in Γ1
16For more details on correctness and the application of this criterion cf. [9] or [4].
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composed by means of logical connectives and quantifiers, and Γ1 itself.17 For
instance, Eq. 3 has complexity 3, for it contains the following subformulas: Fa,
Ga, and Fa ∨ Ga. By contrast, Eq. 4 has complexity 6, as it is composed of Fx,
Gx, x = a, Fx ∨ Gx, x = a ∧ (Fx ∨ Gx), and a =  x(x = a ∧ (Fx ∨ Gx)).
Finally, Quine [32, 160] provides a maxim of adequate formalization—
intended to complement correctness—that will prove to be of crucial impor-
tance for the formalization of factual contexts, viz. the maxim of shallow
analysis: “expose no more logical structure than seems useful for the deduction
or other inquiry at hand”.18 The maxim stipulates that formalizations should
only introduce as much structure as is needed to fulfill the purposes pursued by
resorting to formalizations in the first place. It determines to avoid structural
complexity that is redundant. Or differently, it requires to always choose
the least complex correct formalization that serves the purposes at hand. To
illustrate, consider the informally valid argument 5 and assume the purpose of
formalizing 5 is to formally account for its validity:
5. Socrates is wise. Wisdom is a virtue. Therefore, Socrates is virtuous.
A correct formalization of 5 that reproduces its validity is the formally valid
inference scheme Eq. 6.
Fa , ∀x(Fx → Gx)  Ga (6)
F : . . . is wise ; G : . . . is virtuous ; a : Socrates
Of course, the validity of 5 could also be formally reproduced by introducing
additional structure as done in Eqs. 7 and 8, which are to be read relative to
the interpretation given in Eq. 6 as well.
Fa ∧ a = a , ∀x(Fx ∧ x = x → Gx)  Ga (7)
a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx) , ∀x(Fx → Gx)  a =  x(x = a ∧ Gx) (8)
The premises and conclusion of Eqs. 7 and 8 are each formally equivalent
to their respective counterparts in Eq. 6. Yet, even though Eqs. 7 and 8 are,
hence, correct for 5 iff Eq. 6 is correct for 5, Eqs. 7 and 8 violate shallowness,
for they involve redundant logical structure. There exists another correct
formalization of 5 which is less complex than Eqs. 7 and 8 and which also
accounts for the validity of 5, viz. Eq. 6. Among the correct formalizations of
a statement A1 that differ with respect to structural complexity and that fulfill
the purposes at hand only one with lowest complexity measure constitutes a
17For more details cf. [21, 46–47] or [16, 55–56]. Other complexity measures have been proposed
in the literature, cf. e.g. [22, 62] or [9, Chapters 13.4–13.6].
18Cf. also [33, 198], [20, 243], or [9, 322].
550 M. Baumgartner
shallow formalization of A1. The only purpose of formalizing a statement A1
that is of interest in this paper is the formal reproduction of the validity or
invalidity of the arguments that A1 is part of. In extensional contexts, equiva-
lent formalizations of a statement A1 cannot differ with respect to accounting
for the (in)validity of arguments comprising A1. If A1, A2, . . . , Am informally
entail An and this dependence is reproduced by the correct formalizations
contained in the inference scheme Γ1, Γ2, . . . , Γm  Γn, replacing any Γi, 1 ≤
i ≤ n, by a formally equivalent expression Γ ∗i with higher complexity measure
than Γi does not affect the formal validity of that inference scheme, and hence
equally reproduces the corresponding informal dependence—and analogously
for informal independencies. That is, of a set ϕ1 of formally equivalent formal-
izations that are correct for A1 and contribute to accounting for the (in)validity
of A1’s argumentative context, only the least complex satisfy shallowness.
For the purposes of this paper we can thus define the notion of a shallow
formalization as follows: A formalization Γ1 of a statement A1 is shallow iff
Γ1 is correct for A1 and there does not exist another formalization Γ ∗1 of A1
that is formally equivalent to Γ1 and has a lower complexity measure than Γ1.
Introducing redundant structure, i.e. additional structural complexity that
does not change a subformula’s truth conditions, into extensional contexts
merely generates unnecessary complications, but does not turn valid inference
schemes into invalid ones, or vice versa. Thus, Quine’s primary rationale
for the maxim of shallow analysis was simply to avoid superfluous work in
the course of formalizing extensional statements.19 However, what holds for
extensional contexts does not necessarily hold for non-extensional ones as well.
Indeed, the slingshot argument reveals that replacing a first-order expression
as Fa within a factual context by a formally equivalent, yet more complex
expression as a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx) may give rise to incorrect inferences, i.e. to
inferences that do not have informal counterparts. Moreover, these incorrect
inferences could not be drawn on the mere basis of Fa. While in extensional
contexts replacing a formalization Γi by a more complex equivalent expression
Γ ∗i cannot induce incorrect inferences, factual contexts are sensitive to the
introduction of excessive logical structure. That is, if a correct formalization Γ1
of A1 that contributes to formally reproducing the (in)validity of an argument
featuring “The fact that A1 is . . . ” is replaced by an equivalent more complex
formalization Γ ∗1 , it may turn out that the (in)validity of the corresponding
argument is no longer successfully accounted for. In consequence, the status
of shallow analysis in factual contexts differs significantly from its status in
extensional contexts. In factual contexts, excessive logical structure does not
merely induce unnecessary complications, but, as the slingshot demonstrates,
may give rise to incorrect inferences and to conflicts between informal and
formal validity assessments.
19Correspondingly, shallow analysis is commonly not seen as a necessary condition of adequate
formalization (cf. [9, Chapter 13]).
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These considerations and the conceptual resources assembled above pave
the way towards a restriction of @+ -Subs that renders (ζ1), (ζ3), and (ζ4)
formally invalid and allows for the formal reproduction of the validity of
arguments 1 to 5: Within factual contexts, co-referring definite descriptions
and proper names can only be replaced s.v. in shallow formalizations. More
specifically, @+ -Subs must be restricted such that, first, it is only applicable
to shallow formalizations embedded in factual contexts, i.e. to shallow factual
contexts, and second, such that no redundant structure is introduced, that is,
such that shallowness is preserved. If we let Σs(α) and Σs( xΦx) stand for
shallow formalizations containing the name α and the description  xΦx, re-
spectively, the required restriction of @+ -Subs can be spelled out as follows:
@s+ -Subs :  xΦx = α α =  xΦx  xΦx =  xΨ x
@[Σs( xΦx)] @[Σs(α)] @[Σs( xΦx)]
@[Σs(α)] @[Σs( xΦx)] @[Σs( xΨ x)]
As shall be substantiated in the following, @s+ -Subs resolves the slingshot
conflict without giving rise to other conflicts between formal and informal
validity assessments.
To see that the Gödelian slingshot argument turns out to be invalid,
given that @+ -Subs is rejected in favor of @s+ -Subs, reconsider (ζ1). This
exemplary instance of the slingshot involves the statements (a), (b), (c), and
(d), the first three of which do not informally imply the fourth. That is, “(a),
(b), (c). Therefore, (d)” is an informally invalid argument. This invalidity can
be formally accounted for in a straightforward way:
Fa, Ga, @[Fa]  @[Ga] (9)
a : Obama ; F : . . . is a politician ; G : . . . is married
@[. . .] : The fact that . . . is identical to the fact that Obama is a politician.
Equation 9 comprises correct and minimally complex formalizations of (a) to
(d). There do not exist formally equivalent expressions with lower complexity
measures, for the complexity measures of Fa, Ga and of @[Fa], @[Ga] are
minimal: 1 and 2, respectively. That is, Eq. 9 features shallow formalizations.
As there are no identity statements, it is impossible to apply @s+ -Subs, and
hence impossible to deduce @[Ga] from Fa, Ga, and @[Fa].
As we have seen in Section 2 though,  -Conv and @+ -Conv permit to
introduce identity statements into the formalizations of (a) and (c). However,
since a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx) is formally equivalent to Fa, its additional complexity
is redundant. a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx) is on a par with infinitely many other formu-
las that are formally equivalent to Fa, as Fa ∧ a = a or 1 =  x((x = 1 ∧ Fa) ∨
(x = 0 ∧ ¬Fa)), all of which feature excessive logical structure. None of these
formalizations is shallow. Accordingly, @s+ -Subs cannot be applied if any
of them is embedded in a factual context. This, in turn, renders the step from
line [7] to [8] of (ζ1) invalid, and thereby blocks the slingshot. The slingshot
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argument as given in (ζ1) essentially draws on the introduction of logical
structure that in no way affects the truth conditions of the formulas embedded
in the corresponding factual contexts. While in extensional contexts such
excessive structure is harmless, in factual contexts it may give rise to conflicts
between formal and informal validity assessments. Therefore, to adequately
formally reproduce inferential dependencies among (or truth conditions of)
factual statements, the substitutability of singular terms must be restricted to
shallow formalizations.
Such a restriction of @+ -Subs also invalidates (ζ3). The statement (e),
i.e. “Obama is identical to the one who is Obama and a politician” is not
shallowly formalized in terms of a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx), with F representing “. . . is
a politician” and a referring to Obama. There exists a formally equivalent
correct formalization with lower complexity measure, viz. Fa. Notwithstanding
its misleading grammatical surface, (e) is informally equivalent to “Obama is
a politician”. Hence, both of the equivalent formalizations a =  x(x = a ∧ Fx)
and Fa are correct for (e) as well as for “Obama is a politician”. The formal-
ization with lowest complexity measure, i.e. the shallow formalization of both
statements, is Fa. Therefore, @s+ -Subs does not sanction the transition of
lines [1] and [2] of (ζ3) to line [3]. For analogous reasons, rejecting @+ -Subs
in favor of @s+ -Subs renders (ζ4) invalid as well.
While @s+ -Subs blocks both the slingshot and incorrect inferences along
the lines of (ζ3) and (ζ4), direct applications of @s+ -Subs to shallow formal-
izations of the statements involved in arguments as 2, 3, or 4 straightforwardly
account for their informal validity. To see this, consider argument 4 and let F
stand for “. . . is a son of Servilia Caepionis”, G for “. . . stabbed Caesar”, H for
“. . . is a husband of Porcia Catonis”, p for “Caesar died”, and @[. . . , . . .] for
the factual causal connective. The following application of @s+ -Subs directly
leads from the premises of 4 to its conclusion:
(ζ5) 1 [1] @[G xFx, p] A
2 [2]  xFx =  xHx A
1,2 [3] @[G xHx, p] 1,2, @s+ -Subs
Similarly, if we additionally introduce a as referring to Brutus, the informal
validity of 2 is reproducible by means of @s+ -Subs:
(ζ6) 1 [1] @[Ga, p] A
2 [2] a =  xFx A
1,2 [3] @[G xFx, p] 1,2, @s+ -Subs
Note that @s+ -Subs renders the formal validity of inference schemes
involving factual contexts dependent on their structural complexity. In this
respect factual and extensional contexts differ significantly: While the intro-
duction of redundant structure into a valid inference scheme only featuring
extensional contexts cannot overturn the latter’s validity, such specifications of
inference schemes containing factual contexts do not necessarily conserve va-
lidity. In consequence, to formally reproduce the informal validity of a purely
extensional argument S1, S1 may be formalized at any level of complexity,
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whereas to formally reproduce the informal validity of a factual argument S2,
S2 must be formalized shallowly. Consider the following variation of 2:
6. The fact that Brutus is the one who is Brutus and stabbed Caesar caused
the fact that Caesar died. Brutus is identical to the son of Servilia Caepi-
onis. Therefore, the fact that the son of Servilia Caepionis is the one who
is the son of Servilia Caepionis and stabbed Caesar caused the fact that
Caesar died.
Just as 2, 6 is an informally valid argument. Indeed, the premises and
conclusion of 2 and 6 are informally equivalent—the component statements of
the latter being unnecessarily cumbersome. Yet, only a shallow formalization
that correctly reproduces the premises and conclusion of 6 as Eq. 10—whose
formal validity is proven in (ζ6)—mirrors the validity of 6. By contrast, for-
malization Eq. 11 which correctly but non-shallowly captures the premises and
conclusion of 6 amounts to an invalid inference scheme, because @s+ -Subs is
not applicable to the first premise of Eq. 11.
@[Ga, p], a =  xFx  @[G xFx, p] (10)
@[a=  x(x=a ∧ Gx), p], a=   yFy  @[  yFy=  x(x=   yFy∧Gx), p] (11)
That means the grammatical surface of argument 6 is misleading as to the
valid form 6 instantiates. To formally mirror the validity of informally valid
arguments featuring factual contexts, these arguments must be formalized
shallowly—even if that requires digressing from the grammatical surface of
formalized arguments.
In sum, an adequate formal reproduction of factual contexts calls for strict
adherence to Quine’s maxim of shallow analysis. By shallowly formalizing fac-
tual contexts the slingshot argument is blocked, while the validity of arguments
as 1 to 4 and 6 remains formally reproducible.
6 Conclusion
The slingshot argument essentially draws on the introduction of redundant
logical structure into factual contexts. While such redundancies do not give rise
to incorrect inferences in extensional contexts, factual contexts are sensitive
to excessive logical structure. That is the primary lesson to draw from the
slingshot argument. This paper has moreover shown that factual contexts differ
from hyperintensional ones as belief contexts in two crucial respects: First,
logical equivalents can be substituted s.v. within factual contexts while such
substitutions are invalid in hyperintensional contexts, and second, a specific
type of expressions, viz. shallow ones, allow for substitutions of co-referring
singular terms within factual contexts while such substitutions are generally
invalid within hyperintensional ones. In this sense, factual contexts occupy a
middle ground between extensional and hyperintensional contexts.
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Thus, this paper suggests the following answers to our introductory ques-
tions (Q1) and (Q2).
(A1) If definite descriptions embedded in factual contexts are interpreted
referentially, logical equivalents can generally be substituted s.v. within
factual contexts, i.e. PSLE and its special case  -Conv hold unrestrict-
edly for factual contexts. If definite descriptions in factual contexts
are spelled out in a Russellian vein, @+ -Conv only holds if definite
descriptions are interpreted with narrow scopes. Furthermore, co-
referring proper names and definite descriptions can be substituted s.v.
in shallow factual contexts. That is, @+ -Subs must be restricted in
terms of @s+ -Subs.
(A2) Adequate formalizations of factual contexts must not only be correct
but moreover shallow.
Of course, (A1) and (A2) do not yet constitute an exhaustive account
of formalizing factual contexts. Many open questions remain. For instance,
correctness and shallowness are necessary but certainly not sufficient for the
adequacy of formalizations of factual contexts, or PSLE and @s+ -Subs are
not the only inference rules that can be validly applied to factual contexts.
However, (A1) and (A2) constitute a necessary core of an adequate account
of formalizing factual contexts which avoids conflicts between assessments
of informal and formal dependencies among statements featuring factual
contexts, and thus validates (VP). We have found that such conflicts arise
because formal systems that treat definite descriptions or class abstracts as
primitive referring terms allow for the introduction of certain kinds of exces-
sive logical structure into factual contexts to which these contexts are sensitive.
If factual contexts are consistently shallowly formalized, such conflicts are
avoided. This finding does not teach us anything about the metaphysics of
facts, which, after all, must be conceived of in light of the theoretical work
facts are supposed to do within a broader metaphysical (or philosophical)
picture. Nor does it teach us anything about the quality of formalisms featuring
primitive iota-expressions or class abstracts, which, after all, have proven to be
very profitably applicable, for instance, to the formalization of statements of
number theory (cf. e.g. [6]). Rather, this finding teaches us something about
how our informal understanding of factual contexts is adequately reproduced
by means of available formal tools. If Quine’s maxim of shallow analysis is
rigorously respected in the course of formalizing factual contexts, definite
descriptions can be understood referentially without conflicts arising between
informal and formal validity assessments with respect to arguments featuring
factual contexts, and, accordingly, without having to settle for a fine-grained
metaphysics of facts.
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